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Abstract: Incentives are a major part of what defines the “economics” part in experimental 
economics. We discuss experimental approaches to addressing confounds that can arise with 
incentive payments to experimental subjects. They include choice of salient payoff levels to 
insure dominance, experience to promote understanding, alternative institutional formats to vary 
accessibility of payoff information, and lottery payoffs to induce risk neutrality. We examine 
issues that arise with response mode effects and game form misconception. Choice of which 
instruments to use and when to use them is part of the art of experimental design that should be 
informed by the research questions of interest and the type of confounds that are expected in a 
given environment and economic institution. One confound that is frequently not addressed in 
the literature is use of payoff protocols that are not incentive compatible. We call attention to this 
issue.  
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James C. Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Incentives are a major part of what defines the “economics” part in experimental economics. A 
“salient” incentive payment varies with the outcomes in an experiment that result from actions by 
the subjects (Wilde 1981).2 A participation fee that does not vary with subjects’ actions is not 
salient. Economic experiments commonly, but not always, use monetary incentives.3 Since salient 
monetary incentives vary with outcomes that result from subjects’ actions, they provide motivation 
to subjects not satiated in money (Smith 1976) for undertaking actions within an experiment.  
Smith (1976) identifies three complications (or “qualifications”) that can confound control 
in an experiment: (1) subjective cost, (2) interpersonal utilities, and (3) value of playing the game.4 
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and Smith (1976) stress the importance of: (4) complete vs. incomplete 
information. We add: (5) response mode effects (Grether and Plott 1979, Cox and Grether 1996); 
and (6) game-form misconception (Plott and Zeiler 2005, Cason and Plott 2014).  
In following sections, we provide examples of how such complications interact with 
experimental methods in several topic areas of research. The discussion will focus on experimental 
approaches to control for confounds. The choice of the salient payoff level (dominance of the 
reward, Wilde 1981) is used as an important instrument to offset subjective costs. Other 
instruments include: withholding information on others’ payoffs (privacy, Wilde 1981) to inhibit 
triggering interpersonal preferences (when they are not being studied); practice rounds or 
repetition to promote understanding; alternative institutional formats (e.g. game trees and price 
clocks) to vary accessibility of payoff information; and binary lottery payoffs to incentivize risk 
neutrality (when it is being assumed). We discuss how salient payoffs can interact with 
 
1Andreas Ortmann, an anonymous reviewer, and an editor provided helpful comments and suggestions on a 
preliminary draft of this chapter. We thank the National Science Foundation (grant number SES-1658743) for research 
funding. 
2 Saliency, dominance, and privacy are among the precepts discussed by Smith (1982a), who attributes these three to 
Louis Wilde. For scholarly accuracy we follow Smith and cite Wilde (1981). (The correct year of publication and 
edited book title for Wilde’s seminal chapter are included below in our References.)   
3 Paying money to subjects can, potentially, lead to self-selection by participants more strongly motivated by financial 
compensation. Such possible selection may or may not be a problem depending on the research question addressed in 
an experiment. One topic area in which this type of subject self-selection could be a concern is in experiments on 
eliciting social preferences. Falk et al. (2014) report little selection effect in a social preferences experiment. 
4 See also Siegel (1961) and Fouraker and Siegel (1963). In today’s terminology, “interpersonal utilities” would be 
labeled other-regarding preferences or social preferences.  
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experimental task repetition and economic institutions to affect subjects’ behavior. The last section 
discusses problems with the common practice of experimentalists using payoff protocols in 
experiments with more than one decision that are not incentive compatible for eliciting true 
preferences within each decision. 
 In discussing incentives, it is natural to view the experimenter as a principal and the 
subjects as agents. The experimenter controls the set of available actions and the mapping from 
actions to outcomes, and wants the subject to choose her most preferred action assuming she 
completely understands the environment and institution and has zero subjective cost from 
experimental task completion. We call this the Experimental Decision Problem.   
One difficulty is that the experimental tasks given to subjects may be unfamiliar to them, 
and it may require effort to understand the tasks and the implications of alternative actions. If the 
subject incurs a subjective cost from experimental task completion then her choice will be the most 
preferred given her subjective effort cost, which may confound interpretation of the data because 
such cost is not observable.5  We call this the Subject’s Decision Problem. In this way the existence 
of subjective cost creates a moral hazard problem the experimenter needs to address. One way to 
better align the incentives of the subjects and experimenter is through dominant salient rewards 
that compensate for subjective cost by increasing the opportunity cost of actions that are 
suboptimal for the Experimental Decision Problem.  
If a lazy or distracted subject does not understand the experimental environment or 
institution then providing larger payoffs may motivate effort leading to better understanding.6 In 
addition, scaled-up payoffs can reduce decision errors from random choices from among actions 
with trivial economic consequences. In contrast, larger payoffs may not improve quality of data if 
a subject believes she understands the experimental environment and institution but is mistaken. 
If there is “failure of game form recognition” (Cason and Plott 2014) then scaled-up payoffs may 
not be helpful but providing subjects with opportunities for learning may produce data that more 
accurately reflect the subject’s preferences.7 This issue is discussed below (in section 8). Paying 
subjects real salient payoffs, by itself, does not correct for response mode effects such as preference 
 
5 Smith, 1976; see also Camerer and Hogarth, 1999.  
6 See Ariely et al. (2009) for discussion of the boundaries of the effectiveness of this approach.  
7 There is some evidence that eliciting beliefs about play by others can elicit choices more consistent with theoretical 
predictions (e.g., Croson 2000 finds that it promotes defection and free riding) but eliciting beliefs can cause cross-
task contamination from hedging.  Space limitations prevent us from discussing these issues. For a survey on belief 
elicitation, see Schlag, et al. (2015).   
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reversals (Grether and Plott 1979).8  In contrast, the preference reversal phenomenon is not robust 
to repetitive decisions in markets with large salient payoffs (Cox and Grether 1996).9 
In many-decision experiments, a subject who does understand the experimental 
environment and institution will be motivated to provide biased data (that is, make choices that do 
not reflect her true preferences at the single decision level) if the experimenter uses a mapping 
from multiple choices to payoffs – a payoff protocol or payoff mechanism – that is not incentive 
compatible.10 Use of incentive incompatible payoff protocols is widespread in the literature, most 
especially in experiments on decisions under risk, but also in many other topic areas (Cox et al. 
2015). This issue is discussed in section 9.  
We next present an historically important example that illustrates use of induced valuation 
to create controlled supply and demand in markets. The experimenter’s objective is to learn about 
the efficiency properties of market institutions. The induced supply and demand schedules make 
efficiency of market allocations unambiguously measurable by researchers. 
 
 2. INDUCED VALUATION IN LABORATORY MARKET EXPERIMENTS  
In a laboratory market experiment a researcher assigns values to a buyer for each unit of an abstract 
commodity that the buyer can buy, Vj , for j = 1, 2, ... n: 
 
(1) V1 > V2 > V3 > … > Vn 
 
Similarly, costs are assigned to a seller for each unit that the seller can sell, Ci , for i = 1, 2, ... m:  
(2) C1 < C2 < C3 < … < Cm 
This provides an example of the experimental method called induced valuation (Smith 1976). 
These values and costs are ordinarily the private information of buyers and sellers. 
 
8 A preference reversal occurs when a subject chooses lottery a over lottery b but places a higher selling price on the 
latter. 
9 Evidence on the effect of salient payoffs on choices is mixed (Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann, 
2001). Camerer and Hogarth (1999) covers 74 studies: 22 studies report a positive effect of incentives on mean 
performance, 28 studies find no effect, and 9 studies report negative effects. Hertwig and Ortmann (2003) find that 
positive effects are mainly observed in “judgments and decisions” studies whereas evidence on “no effects” comes 
from studies of “games and markets”. Smith and Walker (1993) report that larger monetary incentives decrease 
variance of responses. 
10 In the case of a multi-decision experiment, we say that a payoff protocol is not incentive compatible if it provides 
incentive for a subject with true preference for option a over option b to choose (…,b,…) over (…,a,…) when that 
choice is embedded as one of many and payoffs are generated with the protocol. 
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Salient incentives for exchange are created by an experimenter’s credible promise to pay 
subjects as follows. If a buyer with value Vk exchanges a single unit with a seller with cost Cj at 
the price P then the experimenter pays them the monetary amounts: 
 
 Buyer: Vk – P 
(3)  
 Seller: P - Cj 
 
So long as the subjects prefer more money to less, and transaction costs are negligible, the 
experimenter’s credible promise to pay subjects the monetary amounts given by (3) provides 
incentives to buyers and sellers to search for better deals and induces on buyers and sellers the 
demand and supply prices given by statements (1) and (2).  
 Assume a researcher hopes to learn about the efficiency properties of a market institution 
by conducting an experiment with controlled demand and supply functions created with induced 
valuation.11 One important market institution that reduces transaction and search costs by 
centralizing information on bids and asks is the double auction used on most stock exchanges.12  
A robust finding is that laboratory double auction allocations (of abstract commodities) are highly 
efficient, with efficiencies close to 100 percent within a few repetitions (Smith 1982a, 1982b). 
A stress test of the robustness of high efficiency of the double auction is provided by a 
boundary experimental design in which all values are equal to V and all costs are equal to C, with 
V > C, but there are more units on one side of the market (Smith 1976, 1982a). With this design, 
at competitive equilibrium all gains from exchange go to the short side of the market. With 
privately induced demand and supply schedules, high efficiencies in double auction markets are 
robust to this boundary experiment, at least when small “commissions” are paid to overcome 
transaction costs. Making the values and costs public information, however, impedes convergence 
in this boundary experiment, which seems to reflect the effects of interpersonal utilities. This 
 
11 The observable maximum possible gain from exchange Gmax is given by the area between the market demand and 
supply functions created by induced valuation. The observable realized gain from exchange Gobs is given by the total 
amount of money paid to the experimental subjects following the rules given by statements (3). The measure of 
efficiency of exchange is E = 100 × Gobs/Gmax. 
12 The permissible actions, pricing and contracting rules for a simplified version of the double auction institution in 
which each exchange is a single unit (but buyers and sellers can make multiple exchanges in a market period) are as 
follows (Smith 1982a):  
A. Any buyer can: (1) make a bid to buy a unit at a stated price or  (2) accept an outstanding offer price, which  
makes a market price, and  effects an exchange of a unit;   
B. Any seller can: (1) make an offer to sell a unit at a stated price or (2) accept an outstanding bid price, which 
makes a market price and effects an exchange of a unit. 
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illustrates one reason experimental researchers usually implement induced values and costs as 
private information in order to inhibit possible effects of interpersonal utilities on exchange.13  
 
3. INTERPERSONAL UTILITIES AND INFORMATION 
Duopoly Games. Fouraker and Siegel (1963) conducted several experiments on duopoly (and 
triopoly) designed to study the effect of information about others’ payoffs on decisions. They argue 
that predictions of models that assume simple own-payoff-maximizing agents are more likely to 
be observed in the absence of information on payoffs of other players. Complete information about 
payoffs offers opportunities for interpersonal comparisons, which leads to higher dispersion of 
outcomes as more instances of cooperative or competitive strategies are elicited. Fouraker and 
Siegel identify three types of subjects (or strategies): simple maximizers (own payoff), rivalrous 
competitors (own minus other’s payoff), and cooperators (own plus other’s payoff).  
To investigate whether interpersonal preferences were the source of the diversity of the 
data in the complete information treatment, Fouraker and Siegel used incentives (in the form of 
bonuses) to induce cooperative or rivalrous behavior. To induce cooperation, any pair of subjects 
with total payoff exceeding a certain level of profit received an additional bonus. To induce rivalry, 
within each pair of subjects the subject with the larger profit received a bonus. Subjects participated 
in ten practice rounds with feedback before they played one real monetary payoff round. Their 
data provide support for the validity of: (i) Cournot solution in the Incomplete Information 
treatment; (ii) Cooperative solution in Induced Cooperation treatment; and (iii) Competitive 
solution in Induced Rivalry treatment. An alternative approach, often used these days, is to first 
classify subjects according to their types and then use that information to predict (or explain) 
behavior in the game of interest. This approach was rejected by Fouraker and Siegel on two 
grounds: (1) “…. a priori preference for the experimental rather than the psychometric approach” 
(Fouraker and Siegel 1963, p. 155), and (ii) absence of a reliable method for type classification of 
subjects. 
Centipede Games. Several studies of play in centipede games14 offer examples of use of the 
experimental approach to address issues with interpersonal utilities and subjective costs. Suppose 
the research question is identifying conditions that accelerate breakdown of a joint enterprise that 
 
13 Outside the laboratory, the producer or consumer surplus realized in a market exchange is ordinarily private 
information.   
14 The game was introduced by Rosenthal (1981) to challenge common knowledge of rationality.  
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can be modeled as a centipede game. One might expect the play of the game to be affected by 
efficiency (e.g., exponentially increasing centipede games), when total payoffs increase as the 
game continues, as well as by asymmetry of the distribution of the total payoff (e.g., competitive 
centipede games).   
Krockow et al. (2016) provide a survey of experimental studies of centipede games from 
1992 to 2016 covering 72 treatments. Play in competitive centipede game experiments reported by 
Fey et al. (1996) and Cox and James (2012) is closest to complete unraveling to a take at the first 
opportunity.  
 To control for efficiency considerations, Fey et al. (1996) study play in a constant-sum 
centipede game, in which “not quitting” never increases total payoff to all players. The unique 
outcome of Nash equilibrium (with selfish, fair or efficiency preferences) of this game is quitting 
at the very first node. They find that in the 6-node and 10-node games, after the fifth match the 
average exit rates at the initial node are 0.70 and 0.53.15  In comparison, the exit rates in the first 
five matches are 0.46 (6-node game) and 0.37 (10-node game). These figures highlight the 
importance of providing subjects with opportunities for learning about the structure of the game 
and the play of others by repeatedly playing the game.    
The experiment reported by Cox and James (2012) preserves efficiency but: (i) induces 
rivalry by allocating all gains to the quitter; (ii) discourages “never quit” with zero end-node 
payoffs (Aumann 1992) and (iii) uses private payoff information. Two institutional formats, tree 
and clock, are used to study play of their exponential, zero end-node-payoff centipede game (see 
Figures 1-3 in Cox and James 2012).16  The clock format needs more cognitive effort to appreciate 
efficiencies lost by quitting at early nodes as it requires a mental picture of the future payoffs; such 
payoffs are visually explicit in the tree. Within a couple of matches, complete unraveling of play 
is observed in simultaneous move games as well as in sequential move games with clock format 
(see Figures 6 and 7 in Cox and James 2012).17 A slower convergence to complete unraveling is 
observed in the tree format with simultaneous moves.  
 
15 The maximum payoff in the game is $2.92. Subjects participated in nine to ten matches with randomly matched 
opponents.  
16 The tree format is an extensive form game tree that provides payoff information for all decision nodes in the game. 
The clock format, conventionally used in Dutch auctions, provides payoff information only for the currently-active 
decision node. 
17 The maximum payoff in the game is $20. Subjects participated in ten matches after three practice rounds. 
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Two studies that use payoff level as an instrument in their experimental approach are 
Rapoport et al. (2003) and Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009). Rapoport et al. (2003) conduct three-
player, zero end-node-payoff centipede games with exponentially increasing payoffs, vary the 
scale of payoffs, and provide abundant opportunities for behavior to stabilize.18  In the high-payoff 
experiment, in the last fifteen matches 72 percent of exits were observed at the initial node. In the 
regular-payoff experiment only 2.6 percent of exits were at node 1. They conclude that increasing: 
(i) payoff level, (ii) number of players, and (iii) number of matches accelerate unraveling. Palacios-
Huerta and Volij (2009) use both experienced (chess player) and regular (student) subjects in play 
of an exponentially increasing centipede game with payoffs ten-times the ones used in the first 
study of centipede game by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). When chess masters play each other in 
the field experiment with only one match, more than 73 percent of the exits are at the initial node. 
In the laboratory, after the fifth match, when chess masters play each other the exit rate at the initial 
node is 100 percent but down to 60 percent when chess masters play students.19  Despite the high 
payoff levels, data from students playing students are similar to the ones observed by McKelvey 
and Palfrey.20 Palacios-Huerta and Volij argue against social preferences and favor own rationality 
and belief in others’ rationality as accounting for play in perfect information games. 
 
4. INTERPERSONAL UTILITIES AND EMPIRICAL VALIDITY OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS  
The standard ultimatum bargaining game (UBG) models a one-time interaction between two 
agents, one proposing an allocation ((1-r)S, rS) of a certain amount of money, S and the other given 
the power to veto implementation of the proposal. The standard dictator game (DG) takes the veto 
power away from the non-proposer. Because there are no strategic considerations in the DG, the 
game has been a favorite tool in measuring interpersonal utilities.  
Nash equilibrium is of little help for modeling play in UBG because it can support any 
outcome ((1-r)S, rS) but subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten 1961) makes sharper predictions.21 
 
18 The maximum payoffs used in the high-stakes and regular-stakes treatments in Rapoport et al. (2003) were $2,560 
and $25.6. Subjects participated in 60 matches.  
19 Caution is needed in interpreting this result because Levitt, et al. (2011) did not find that play by chess masters 
unraveled in their centipede game experiment. They did find many chess masters backward induct in their Race to 
100 game.  
20 See also Smith (2010, page 5-8) for a discussion on backward induction and its empirical validity being regularly 
challenged by data. 




Starting with Güth et al. (1982), play in UBG turned out to be a difficult problem for induced 
valuation in the laboratory, setting the stage for an extensive research program pushing the idea 
that interpersonal utilities should be incorporated into players’ utilities of outcomes to make proper 
inferences from the data. As discussed above, the early approach (Smith 1976) to control for 
interdependencies was through privacy (i.e., no information on others’ payoffs). The usefulness of 
this approach, however, is limited when the research question is empirical validity of a solution 
concept, which usually requires knowledge of payoffs of others. 
There have been numerous studies of play in UBG with differing payoff scales.22 In a 
survey of 37 studies of UBG, Oosterbeek et al. (2004) find that: (i) shares are around 40 percent 
and decrease in amount available to share (S), and (ii) rejection rates about 16 percent. In a recent 
study motivated by reports of insensitivity of responder behavior to payoff scale.23 Andersen et al. 
(2011) attribute the insensitivity to scarcity of offers below 20 percent. They find support for the 
use of very large payoff levels on decreasing rejections.24 Unfortunately, as they do not have a 
dictator game to compare distributions of offers in DG and UBG it remains open whether their 
data from the treatment with the largest payoff scale support subgame perfect equilibrium.  
 Rather than interpersonal utilities, Hoffman et al. (1994) explores several hypotheses about 
effects of experimental protocols on play. The instruments used by Hoffman et al. to control for 
confounds include: neutral wording, exchange framing, contest role assignment, and double blind 
payoff protocol to control for experimenter “audience” effect.25 Lower offers and higher 
acceptance rates were observed with contest entitlements, double blind payoffs and exchange 
framing.26 
 
22 For surveys see Oosterbeek et al. (2004) and Karagozoglu and Urban (2016); for a meta-study of UBG see Tisserand 
(2014). 
23 Cited examples include Slonim and Roth (1998), Cameron (1999), and Munier and Zaharia (2002). 
24 Average (aggregated) rejection rates across their four payoff levels were: 36 percent, 43 percent, 28 percent and 4 
percent. The dollar equivalents of the rupee payoffs {20, 200, 2000, 20000} were {$0.41, $4.1, $41, $410}. Daily 
average wage in India was 100 rupees.  
25 In a double anonymous (or “double blind”) payoff protocol subjects’ actions are anonymous to everyone, including 
the experimenter. It is possible to pay the subjects salient rewards from an experiment but preserve their anonymity 
by the following procedure. Have each subject choose one from among N identical-looking sealed envelopes. Each 
envelope contains a uniquely numbered key. Subjects are instructed to keep their key numbers private but enter them 
in their computers or paper response forms. At the end of the experiment, a subject uses the key to open, in private, a 
numbered mailbox containing salient rewards from their participation in the experiment.   
26 In $10 games, the percentage of offers greater than or equal to $4 were 45 percent (contest and exchange) and 85 
percent (random role assignment and “divide $10” wording).  
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In the same spirit, Stahl and Haruvy (2008) argue that behavior in UBG reflects unintended 
induced social context by the verbal description of the game. They implemented UBG with a game 
tree representation in addition to a standard verbal description of the game. Observed play was 
similar to other studies of UBG in the verbal representation but close to SPE with selfish 
preferences in the tree representation.27  Stahl and Haruvy used both conventional bargaining over 
shares of the pie as well as bargaining over probabilities of receiving the whole pie (in binary 
lotteries). They find no effect on proposers or responders from this use of binary lottery payoffs. 
Binary lotteries have been proposed as an instrument for inducing risk neutrality, an issue that we 
take up in section 6.  
While many researchers (Hoffman et al. 1994, Stahl and Haruvy 2008, Smith 2010) take 
the position that what appears as “interpersonal utility” may reflect arbitrary role assignments, 
social norms triggered by the presence of audience (experimenter) effects, or suggestive 
description of the decision task, others (Kahneman et al.1986, Bolton 1991, Rabin 1993) have 
shifted towards inclusion of interpersonal utilities in the Experimental Decision Problem. This 
initiated an explosive research program on assessing interpersonal utilities via experiments with 
the dictator game (DG).28  
 The generosity of subjects’ choices, however, can depend on the protocol used to assign 
endowments in an experiment. This has been clearly established in experiments on DG that 
compare data from treatments in which subjects earn their endowments rather than having them 
randomly assigned by the experimenter. Cherry et al. (2002) had subjects, who would subsequently 
make decisions in a dictator game, first earn their endowments by answering questions from the 
Graduate Management Admissions Test (GMAT). Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), in addition, had 
recipients earn money by answering GMAT/GRE questions.29 Allocations to the recipients were 
largest when recipients earned money and least when dictators earned money. Combining 
endowments earned by dictators with a double blind payoff protocol has very striking results: in 
 
27 In the tree-representation 69 percent of proposers chose the most selfish available offer and 96 percent of responders 
accepted the offer.  In the verbal representation, these figures were down to 23 percent and 49 percent. 
28 This research program has taken on a life of its own: Google Scholar returns more than 60,000 results for “dictator 
games”.  A seminal paper in this literature is by Andreoni and Miller (2002) who vary the price of giving and dictator’s 
endowment to test whether observed dictators’ choices satisfy GARP (i.e., whether dictators’ choices are 
rationalizable by convex preferences). They rule in favor of rationalizability, a conclusion that has been challenged 
by some later studies (Bardsley 2008, List 2007, Lazear et al. 2012, Cappelen et al. 2013).   
29 In Cherry et al (2002) subjects answering 10 or more questions correctly received $40 endowments; others received 
$10 endowments. In Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), subjects who performed the earning task were assigned CAN$10, 
CAN$20 and CAN$40 if the total number of correct answers were fewer than 9, between 9 and 14, or exceeding 15.  
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Cherry et al. (2002), 97 percent of the $40 dollar earners allocated $0 to the paired recipient 
whereas the zero gift figure in Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) was 100 percent of dictators. In Oxoby 
and Spraggon’s receiver earning treatment, 63 percent of dictators’ offers exceeded 50 percent of 
the money for recipients who earned CAN$40 while no dictators made such offers in the (no earned 
endowments) baseline. Differences in generosity stemming from earned vs. unearned endowments 
are also reported by others (e.g., Ruffle 1998, List 2007).  
5. FOCAL POINTS: SCALE AND ASYMMETRY OF PAYOFFS 
In a seminal paper, Schelling (1957) explores principles that underlie negotiations and bargaining 
(tacit or explicit) when communication is not possible. Focal points emerging in tacit (common or 
divergent interest) coordination games are thoroughly examined through a series of ingeniously 
constructed scenarios. Here we focus on common interest and divergent interest coordination 
games and the effect of scale of payoffs on the efficacy of focal points for reducing coordination 
failure.  
The two games differ only with respect to the symmetry of payoffs when coordination is 
successful. With an action set of only two alternatives, say A and B, choosing differently is worth 
nothing. In the game with common interest, coordination on either action is valued the same 
( ( , ) ( , ), , )i iA A B B i a b = = , whereas in the divergent-interest case game players have favored 
actions: ( , ) ( , )a aA A B B   and ( , ) ( , )b bB B A A  . The experimenter can induce these 
rankings by offering to pay the same positive payment in the common-interest game only when 
both players choose the same action. In the divergent-interest game, positive payments are again 
offered only when both players choose the same action but player a’s payment is larger if the 
coordination is on action A whereas player b’s payment is larger if the coordination is on action B.  
In the common-interest game, there are only two payoffs so we can interpret payoffs as von 
Neumann-Morgenstern (N-M) utilities. In contrast, in the divergent-interest game there are more 
than two distinct payoffs so we can only interpret induced payoffs as N-M utilities with the 
subsidiary hypothesis that the subjects are risk neutral.  
Parravano and Pulsen (2015) study the effect of payoff scale on play in these two games.30 
 
30 In the symmetric coordination game, payoffs (in British Pounds) are: (0.5, 0.5) in Low, (5, 5) in Medium and (15, 
15) in High. In the asymmetric coordination game, payoffs are: (0.5, 0.6) in Low, (5, 6) in Medium and (15, 18) in 
High.   
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If payoffs are indeed N-M utilities, then larger stakes through positive affine transformations of 
payoffs should have no effect on equilibrium play. But in the presence of decision costs, larger 
stakes may facilitate coordination by increasing the opportunity cost of not coordinating.  In all 
cases, choosing different actions results in earnings of 0 for both players. However, the opportunity 
cost to each player of non-coordination is 30 (resp. 10) times as much in the High (resp. Medium) 
treatment than in the Low treatment. Authors find higher average coordination rates with High 
stakes than Low stakes but no difference between Medium stakes and Low stakes in the common-
interest coordination game. Play in the divergent-interest game is not affected by the stakes. The 
authors argue that neither mixed strategies, nor Level-k reasoning, nor team reasoning can explain 
the pay effect on their data.  
These data illustrate that if the opportunity cost of an inferior action is non-negligible and 
interdependent preferences are aligned with selfish ones (by design in the common-interest 
coordination game) then scaled-up payoff may be successful in promoting use of focal points 
(labeled salience here31) as coordination devices.   
6. BINARY LOTTERY PAYOFFS FOR CONTROLLING CURVATURE OF UTILITIES 
Consider an experiment in which subject j will be paid the amount of money ( , )j jx X −  if he 
chooses some action jx  and other agents choose the vector of actions jX − .  If the experimenter is 
testing the implications of a risk neutral theory, he is interested in subject j addressing the 
Experimental Decision Problem:  
(4)                         max ( , ) ( )
j
j j j j
x
x X f X dX − − −  
where ( )jf X −  represents risk neutral agent j’s belief that other risk neutral agents will choose the 
vector of actions jX − .  Let agent j be an expected utility (EU) maximizer and her preferences over 
money be represented by some increasing nonlinear function ( )u  .  Then agent j has the Subject’s 
Decision Problem:  
(5)                         max ( ( , )) ( )
j
j j j j
x
u x X g X dX − − −  
 
31 See also Crawford et al. (2008).  
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where ( )jg X − represents EU agent j’s belief that other EU agents will choose the vector of 
actions jX −  .   
How could the experimenter incentivize agent j to take up the Experimental Decision 
Problem?  Binary lottery payoffs were introduced to the theoretical literature by Smith (1961) and 
to experimental methods by Roth and Malouf (1979).  Let  denote the maximum possible payoff 
available to agent j in the game. Now, instead of paying the subject the amount of money 
( , )j jx X −  for action profile ( , )j jx X −  assign the agent prizes A > B (  0) with probabilities 
( , ) /j jx X P −  and 1 ( , ) /j jx X P −− .  Without any loss of generality, set u(A)=1 and u(B)=0  and 
verify that by the axioms of expected utility theory (EU) the Subject’s Decision Problem would 
become  
(6)                         
1
max ( , ) ( )
j
j j j j
x
x X f X dX
P
 − − −  
which is the same as the Experimental Decision Problem.  
 Let’s assume, for the discussion in this paragraph, that lottery payoffs are efficacious for 
controlling curvature of utility of payoffs in experiments. And consider for clarity of example that 
a researcher is testing a theoretical model that incorporates an assumption of linearity in payoffs 
(along with all of the other assumptions in the model). Then would an experimenter want to pay 
subjects with binary lottery payoffs rather than ordinary monetary payoffs? It depends on the 
experimenter’s choice of research question. If a researcher wants to learn whether risk-neutralized 
subjects behave in ways consistent with the risk neutral model’s predictions then use of lottery 
payoffs would be warranted. But that might not be the researcher’s question. The researcher may 
want to learn how well a model predicts the behavior of subjects with whatever risk attitudes and 
other uncontrolled characteristics they may have. Unless the intended domain of application of the 
model is limited to one in which all agents are known to be risk neutral, use of efficacious lottery 
payoffs might produce misleading conclusions about usefulness of the model in predicting 
behavior.32 
 
32 Whether or not a researcher “should” use lottery payoffs for experiments testing risk neutral models has been 




If we drop the assumption that lottery payoffs are known to be efficacious in inducing 
linearity in payoffs then questions about using them become more complicated. Papers reporting 
results from testing efficacy of lottery payoffs have produced conflicting conclusions.33  
 
7. RESPONSE MODE EFFECTS CONFOUNDING INDUCED VALUATION  
Suppose that an experimenter wants to elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. The literature on the 
preference reversal phenomenon provides an example in which use of induced valuation by the 
experimenter can systematically elicit different risk preferences from the subjects when the 
response mode is switched from choice to valuation. This literature also contains a clear example 
of how salient payoffs can interact with task repetition and economic institution to remove the 
response mode effect on elicited risk preferences.  
The choice objects in preference reversal experiments are typically binary lotteries. 
Lotteries or “bets” are presented in pairs containing a probability bet and a money bet with similar 
expected values. The probability bet has a relatively high probability of a relatively low win state 
payoff. The money bet has a relatively low probability of a relatively high win state payoff. The 
experiments involve eliciting preferences with both the choice response mode and the valuation 
response mode. Valuations are elicited for minimum selling prices with an incentive compatible 
revelation mechanism such as the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. If the choice 
and valuation response modes elicit the same preferences then, for any pair of lotteries, the money 
bet should have a higher selling price than the probability bet if and only if the money bet is chosen. 
The “preference reversal phenomenon” (PRP) is that the probability bet is frequently chosen when 
the money bet has a higher selling price.  
Research on the PRP originated in psychology and was brought into economics by Grether 
and Plott (1979). Their paper examines several reasons why the earlier results reported in 
psychology experiments might not have implications for economics. One of these reasons was use 
of hypothetical payoffs in the earlier literature.34 Grether and Plott’s treatments included use of 
hypothetical payoffs and (what were at the time) large monetary payoffs. They found (to their 
 
33 See, for examples: Berg et al. (1986), Walker et al. (1990), Rietz (1993), Cox and Oaxaca (1995), Berg et al. (2008), 
Stahl and Haruvy (2008), Harrison et al. (2013).  
34 One important exception to use of hypothetical payoffs was the experiment run on the floor of a Las Vegas casino 
by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973).  
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surprise) that incidence of preference reversals was somewhat higher in the monetary payoff 
treatments than in the otherwise identical hypothetical payoff experiments. 
The central question addressed in the paper by Cox and Grether (1996) is whether the PRP 
is robust to repetitions in markets. They used the traditional BDM mechanism to elicit selling 
prices in non-market treatments. In market treatments, they used the second price sealed bid 
auction and the English clock auction to elicit selling prices. In addition to experimenting with 
individual choice and market decision making, Cox and Grether included treatments with 
hypothetical and real monetary payoffs of salient rewards. They also included treatments with and 
without repetition of tasks. Cox and Grether reported that: 
(a) The PRP is robust to hypothetical vs. monetary payoffs and to individual choice vs. market 
decisions without repetition. 
(b) With hypothetical payoffs the PRP is robust to individual choice vs. market decisions with 
repetition. 
(c) With monetary payoffs, the PRP is not robust to five rounds of market decision making.  
 
A good question to pose for experimental economists is whether they have data that provides 
clear support for their shared methodological view that subjects should be paid salient monetary 
rewards. Results from this experiment provide an unambiguously clear example. The central 
question for the research is whether the PRP is robust to repeated decisions in markets. With data 
from hypothetical payoff treatments the answer is “yes”. With data from money payoff treatments 
the answer is “no”.  
Insight into the reasons why hypothetical and financial incentives had these implications is 
provided by reviewing the features of the English clock auction in this experiment. Selling prices 
were elicited; therefore the English clock displays decreasing prices. In the case of the money bet 
with $16 win state payoff, the clock started at a price of $16 and decreased by 5 cents every second. 
This means, for example, it would take 243 price clock ticks extending over 243 seconds for the 
price on the clock to decrease to this money bet’s expected value of $3.85. Subject impatience or 
disutility from time spent watching the price clock could be relieved by exiting the auction early 
in the price decrease time period. This is exactly what many subjects did in the treatment with 
hypothetical payoffs (Cox and Grether 1996). But exiting early produces high selling prices for 
the dollar bet and results in high preference reversal rates. In contrast, in the treatments with 
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financial incentives ($16 in the win state or $1.50 in the loss state, and 50 percent of these amounts 
in another treatment), subjects remained in the auction long enough to produce selling prices 
consistent with their choices.35 This example supports an interpretation that it is important to avoid 
hypothetical payoffs when it is expected that subjects may get disutility from playing the game, 
and to use dominant salient monetary payoffs that are sufficiently high to compensate for the 
disutility. In contrast, when playing the game is valued, and accumulating hypothetical payoffs is 
enjoyable, as in some double auction experiments, paying real payoffs may not be necessary.  
The PRP did not disappear in Cox and Grether’s treatments that used repeated decision tasks 
and real payoffs when BDM was used to elicit selling prices. The efficacy of BDM in eliciting true 
buying or selling prices depends on subjects’ understanding of the mechanism, an issue we take 
up next.  
 
8. GAME FORM RECOGNITION CONFOUNDING INDUCED VALUATION 
 
A gap between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) has been reported in 
27 out of 39 experiments listed in Table 1 of Plott and Zeiler (2005).36 The gap, however, 
disappears in Plott and Zeiler (2005) who use BDM as the elicitation mechanism and whose 
experimental procedure includes extensive training of subjects on the elicitation mechanism. In 
light of their findings,  the authors advance the idea that “subject misconception” may explain the 
observed gap.37  
Cason and Plott (2014) take the idea of “game misconception” one step further by studying 
the performance of the BDM mechanism in elicitation of a known value. In their experiment, the 
value of the object is induced (a card that can be exchanged for $2), so no “endowment” effect is 
expected (see also Kahneman et al. 1990). Their data reveal a correlation between WTA and the 
upper bound of the support of stochastic prices used in the BDM elicitation. 
 Cason and Plott argue that low cost of “mistakes” from game misunderstanding can 
explain this correlation but context-dependent “preferences” cannot. Subjects, in search of clues 
for understanding the new mechanism, may pool from their experience and (mistakenly) think of 
 
35 The win state payoff would be about $26 in 2017 dollars. This was “real money” for undergraduate subjects.  
36 Endowment effect and loss aversion have appeared as favorite explanations of the WTP/WTA gap. 
37 For some controversy about these issues, see Isoni et al. (2011) and Plott and Zeller (2011). 
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BDM as a first price (sellers’) auction.38 The “seller with the lowest ask sells the good and receives 
her own ask” is a common experience whereas exposure to exchanges happening at a price 
different that the seller’s ask may be limited. If so, then the optimal asking price in the presence 
of such misconception is increasing in the upper bound of the support of BDM prices, which is 
consistent with the Cason and Plott data. These findings call for caution in interpreting data from 
experiments with possible game misconception as revealing non-standard preferences. Increasing 
the scale of payoffs is expected to fail in ameliorating this type of loss of control for subjects who 
are not aware of their own misconception and who experience little or no opportunity cost from 
their actions.   
Almost half (17 out of 39) of the experiments from the literature on the gap of WTA/WTP 
reviewed by Plott and Zeiler 2005 (Table 1) did not use an incentive compatible mechanism in 
elicitation of valuations. The use of payoff protocols that are not incentive compatible is a common 
but puzzling practice by many researchers. 
9. HOW NOT TO MISUSE INDUCED VALUATION: INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE PAYOFF 
MECHANISMS 
 
A payoff protocol that provides a mapping from a sequence of choices to realized payment is 
incentive incompatible if it provides incentives for a subject, who prefers option a over b in a 
single decision, to prefer b over a when the choice is embedded in a multiple decision setting. Use 
of incentive incompatible payoff protocols is widespread in the literature, most especially in 
experiments on decisions under risk but also in many other topic areas (Cox et al. 2015).  
 The experiment on the preference reversal phenomenon by Grether and Plott (1979) 
generated methodological critiques that have not been generally appreciated more than three 
decades later. Grether and Plott (1979, p. 623) stated “…this behavior is not simply a violation of 
some type of expected utility hypothesis… It suggests that no optimization principles of any sort 
lie behind even the simplest of human choices …”. Such claims of generality elicited critiques by 
Holt (1986) and Karni and Safra (1987).  
 
38 Authors identify 111 (out of 244) subjects whose choices suggest this type of misconception. 
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Karni and Safra (1987) explained that the BDM mechanism used by Grether and Plott to 
elicit selling prices for the binary lottery options in the experiment requires reduction and 
independence axioms to interpret data as preference reversals.  
Grether and Plott asked their subjects to make several decisions and randomly selected one 
decision for payoff. They did this to control for portfolio effects from realizing payoffs from more 
than one decision at the end of the experiment and for wealth effects from paying each decision 
immediately after it was made.39 Their random selection payoff protocol has been given several 
names in the literature; perhaps the most commonly used name is random lottery incentive 
mechanism (RLIM). Holt (1986) explained that RLIM depends on the reduction and independence 
axioms from expected utility theory for interpretation of the data as preference reversals. The 
reasoning is as follows. The choice options in the experiment are binary lotteries. Randomly 
selecting one decision for payoff is itself a lottery. Hence the incentives provided to the subjects 
are compound lotteries consisting of the payoff mechanism “wrapped around” the binary lottery 
options in the experiment. Interpretation of the data as revealing preferences over the binary 
lotteries themselves, rather than preferences over the compound lottery used to incentivize the 
subjects, depends on the reduction and independence axioms; without these axioms, there is no 
theoretical basis for identifying a subject’s responses as revealing her true preferences over the 
binary lotteries in the experiment.40  
The critique by Holt (1986) created a problem for experimental methods intended to test 
theories of decision making under risk other than expected utility theory. Absent known incentive 
 
39 To illustrate “portfolio” and “wealth” effects consider two pairs of lotteries {a,b} and {c,d}. Let the Experimental 
Decision Problem be ranking of lotteries in each pair. The experimenter asks the subject to choose between a and b 
and also choose between d and c. Portfolio Effect: Suppose that the experimenter pays the independently realized 
outcome from each chosen lottery at the end of the experiment. In that case, the Subject’s Decision Problem is to 
choose the most preferred out of the four available portfolios of two lotteries: [a,c], [a,d], [b,c] or [b,d]. The 
Experimental and Subject’s Decision Problems are not the same. For example, if {a,b} and {c,d} are the same pair 
then an EU individual with power 0.5 utility function prefers option a (30 for sure) over option b (100 or 0 with even 
odds) but he prefers portfolio [b,b] if he is asked to choose from {a,b} twice. Wealth Effect: Now suppose that the 
experimenter realizes the payoff from the first chosen lottery in pair {a,b} right after the choice is made. If the outcome 
is some x then when the subject chooses again her choice set is {x+c, x+d} and therefore, the Experimental and 
Subject’s Decision Problems are not the same. This is known in the literature as “wealth effect”. Using the example 
utility above, the subject chooses b the first time. If the outcome is 100 then the second time he chooses b again but if 
the outcome is 0 then he chooses a. 
 
40 Cox et al. (2015) offer counterexamples to incentive compatibility of RLIM in absence of the independence axiom. 
Some wording in Azrieli et al. (2017) might suggest to readers that RLIM (or RPS in their terms) is incentive 
compatible for decision theories other than expected utility theory. But their “Fact 1.1” (Azrieli et al. 2017, p. 16) 




compatible payoff protocols, much literature over the subsequent three decades simply ignores 
Holt’s critique and applies RLIM in experiments intended to test alternatives to EUT such as rank 
dependent utility theory and cumulative prospect theory. Serious problems with this approach are 
provided by counterexamples to incentive compatibility of RLIM in absence of the independence 
axiom (Holt 1986, Cox et al. 2015) and empirical data demonstrating that the bias introduced by 
this payoff mechanism is significant (Cox et al. 2014, 2015; Harrison and Swarthout 2014).  
As first asserted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), a common justification for using RLIM 
in absence of the independence axiom is the empirical assertion that subjects isolate each choice 
independently of the other choice opportunities in an experiment. This assertion is appealing to 
experimentalists because it simplifies experimental design: it allows one to ignore complications 
in interpreting data that come from possible cross-task contamination in many-decision 
experiments. There have been some papers that report isolation is supported by experimental data. 
Starmer and Sugden (1991) and Hey and Li (2005a) consider the two extreme hypotheses that 
subjects: (1) isolate each choice; or (2) make all choices so as to yield the most preferred 
probability distribution of payoffs from the whole experiment (which they named “full reduction”). 
They conclude that full reduction can be rejected in favor of isolation. Hey and Li (2005b) test 
isolation against a hypothesis of “partial reduction” in which the current decision task can be given 
higher or lower weight than preceding tasks when a subject makes decisions so as to choose the 
best probability distribution for the whole experiment. The problem with this approach is that there 
are many alternatives to isolation other than full or partial reduction, including the more plausible 
hypothesis of cross-task contamination between choices.41  
Recent empirical tests have produced consistent evidence of cross-task contamination from 
RLIM. Cox et al. (2014) report that asymmetrically dominated options can be introduced into sets 
of choice options in ways that permit systematic manipulation of subjects’ choices when they are 
paid with RLIM.42 Cox et al. (2015) report additional tests for cross-task contamination by three 
versions of RLIM and find that their RLIM data are characterized by significant choice order 
 
41 Starmer and Sugden (1991, p. 977) report one test for cross-task contamination in which the two-sided p-value is 
0.051. 
42 Let the choice set, S1 be a pair of options {A, B}. Construct a new choice set, S2 = {C, D} such that A dominates C 
but D dominates B. Choosing from S2 first increases attractiveness of A in a subsequent choice from S1. In one 
treatment in Cox et al. (2014), A and C were safe options with payments 4 € and 3 € whereas B and D were even-odds 
risky lotteries with prizes 0 or, resp., 10 € and 12 €. Option B was chosen by 83% of subjects in a single decision task 
(S1) whereas in the two decision tasks (first S2, then S1) only 52% of subjects chose B.   
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effects on revelation of classical paradoxical patterns.  Harrison and Swarthout (2014) report an 
experiment in which a treatment with a single decision is used to generate control data for use in 
econometric analysis of risk attitudes with data generated by a treatment with many decisions and 
use of RLIM to select one decision for payoff. They find that estimated probability weighting for 
RDU is biased by data generated with RLIM.   
Methodological problems with use of incentive incompatible payoff protocols are not 
confined to experiments on theories of decision under risk; instead, as explained by Cox et al. 
(2015), these problems are present in many other topic areas including research on social 
preferences, bargaining, public goods, and voting. The continuing problem with use of incentive 
incompatible payoff protocols apparently stems, in part, from paucity of payoff protocols (for use 
in multiple decision experiments) that do not require the independence axiom. Partial solutions to 
this problem are beginning to be discovered.  
Cox et al. (2015) report theoretical and empirical properties of a new payoff protocol – pay 
all correlated (PAC) – that is incentive compatible for the dual theory of expected utility (Yaari, 
1987).43 Li (2016) introduced the accumulative best choice (ABC) mechanism that is incentive 
compatible for general risk theories, regardless of whether they include the independence axiom, 
which can be used in some types of applications.44  Li finds that ABC is also behaviorally incentive 
compatible for her data.   
Summary Implications: Assuming that the researcher wants to use payoff protocols that are 
incentive compatible − in other words that he or she wants to avoid using payoff protocols that 
create incentives for biased choices − then he or she should observe the following principles of 
experimental methods:45 
1. For risk neutral models, all commonly used methods of paying subjects are incentive 
compatible.  
 
43 With the pay all correlated mechanism, outcomes from all chosen lotteries are paid for one realization of the state 
of nature at the end of the experiment. For this mechanism, states of nature need to be defined and all lotteries arranged 
to be comonotonic. That is, let states be indexed by s (= 1,…,m) and lotteries by i (=1,…,n). If we let πis  denote the 
payoff from lottery i in state s then πis ≥ πis+1 for all states s and all lotteries i. 
44 With the accumulated best choice mechanisms, the chosen option in decision round k is one of the feasible options 
in round k+1. The subject is paid according to the option chosen in the final round.  
45 We end this section with these summary statements because widely read journals continue to publish papers 
reporting experiments with unknown bias in data from use of payoff mechanisms known to be incentive incompatible. 
Cox et al. (2015) contains examples from papers in multiple journals on a range of topic areas.  
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2. Independently realizing outcomes for more than one decision at the end of an experiment 
creates portfolio incentives for risk averse agents.  
3. Randomly selecting one decision for payoff is not incentive compatible unless the 
independence axiom is assumed.  
4. Paying all decisions sequentially is incentive compatible for decision theories defined over 
income, not accumulated wealth.  
5. For comonotonic options, paying all choices at the end of the experiment with one 
realization of the state of nature (PAC) is incentive compatible for the dual theory of 
expected utility. 
6. Giving each subject only one decision task is incentive compatible for all decision theories.  
7. The accumulated best choice (ABC) mechanism is incentive compatible for decision 
theories with complete and transitive preferences. 
 
10. Concluding Remarks  
 
Incentives are a major part of what defines the “economics” part in experimental economics. We 
have discussed several experimental approaches to addressing confounds identified in the 
literature. They include: choice of salient payoff levels to insure dominance, experience (practice 
rounds, repetition) to promote understanding of decision tasks and unfamiliar institutions, 
withholding information on others’ payoffs (privacy) to deter interpersonal preferences (when 
appropriate), alternative institutional formats (e.g. game trees and price clocks) to vary 
accessibility of payoff information; and lottery payoffs to induce risk neutrality. We have 
examined issues that arise with response mode effects and game form misconception. Choice of 
which instruments to use and when to use them is part of the art of experimental design that should 
be informed by the research questions of interest and the type of confounds that are expected in a 
given environment and economic institution. One confound that is frequently not addressed in the 
literature is use of payoff protocols that are not incentive compatible. We call attention to this 
issue.   
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